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WILL EVERYONE GET THEIR BEST MEDICINE?  IMPLICATIONS FOR 
OFF-LABEL USE OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN AN AMERICAN UNIVERSAL 
HEALTHCARE REGIME 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prescribing drugs for off-label uses has become a common practice 
among physicians both in the United States and abroad.1  This is due in part 
to pharmaceutical companies that illegally promote off-label uses to 
doctors.2  The prevalence of lawsuits against such companies suggests that 
large pharmaceutical companies prefer to suffer the consequences of 
violating drug promotion laws rather than spend the money and time to 
conduct clinical tests so that additional uses may be promoted legally.3  This 
idea can be rationalized when one compares the cost of post-market clinical 
tests and the short length of patent protections on certain drugs to the fact 
that doctors maintain the freedom to prescribe any drug for its off-label 
indications, and how drug companies can profit from this off-label use.4  
Since it is arguable that doctors will continue to prescribe drugs for off-label 
uses they find effective without any accompanying Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval, it is understandable why manufacturers will 
continue to find ways around marketing prohibitions to get the word to 
doctors about off-label indications of their products. 
One important consideration is how the consistent use of off-label drugs 
affects Medicare and Medicaid payment schemes.  Both federal programs 
will cover any drug use that has been approved by the FDA, and both will 
cover off-label uses that have been reviewed in a variety of sources that 
 
 1. See generally Elizabeth A. Weeks, Is It Worth the Trouble? The New Policy on 
Dissemination of Information on Off-Label Drug Use Under the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 645 (1999) (discussing the prevalence of 
off-label prescribing in the absence of FDA oversight of physician prescribing practices). 
 2. See generally id. (discussing the illegal promotion of off-label uses by pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and the perceived benefits of promoting off-label uses). 
 3. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Improper Sales of Medicines Targeted Drug Firms Have Paid 
Fines of $3.5 Billion Since 2001 for Wrongful Promotions, BALT. SUN, May 7, 2006, at 1A; 
Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False 
Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 67-68 (2008). 
 4. Johnson, supra note 3, at 69-71; see also Weeks, supra note 1, at 663 (discussing 
the shorter patent life of secondary indications). 
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make up the Congressional compendia.5  Beyond those drugs listed in the 
Congressional compendia, however Medicare Part D and individual state 
Medicaid programs tend to limit what kind of off-label uses they will pay 
for.6  How these government funded programs deal with off-label 
prescribing practices is important when predicting how the issue might be 
handled in a universal healthcare system. 
This note will discuss how Medicare and Medicaid handle the issue of 
off-label prescribing, and will compare the United States’ current approach 
with the approaches of two countries with universal health care coverage, 
the United Kingdom and Switzerland.  This note will also examine how the 
United Kingdom and Switzerland reconcile the rising price of drugs with the 
necessity of controlling costs.  Based on these models, this note will analyze 
how the off-label issue might be best handled if a universal health care 
system were to be implemented in the United States. Any proposal for 
universal healthcare in this country must consider the costs associated with 
providing such a system.  Ultimately, if it is decided that off-label use is 
unnecessary or not cost-effective from the perspective of the insurer, it begs 
the question whether patients who rely on off-label drugs to treat chronic 
symptoms will be left by the wayside in an effort to provide everyone 
“adequate” care. 
This note will first discuss the nature of off-label use in the U.S. and 
abroad, including the regulations pertinent to the approval and promotion 
of pharmaceuticals.  After establishing in Section II that off-label use is likely 
to continue, Section III will then address the ways in which off-label drugs 
prescribed by doctors are covered under the federally funded Medicare 
insurance program and the federal and state funded Medicaid insurance 
program.  These approaches will then be compared to how drugs are 
covered in U.K. and Switzerland.  Section IV will consider several projected 
plans for universal healthcare programs in the United States and, using the 
Medicare and Medicaid models and the two European systems, will analyze 
implications for coverage of off-label use in an American universal health 
care scheme.  Ultimately, this note concludes that the cost of off-label 
prescribing may eventually outweigh patient need in any potential universal 
healthcare regime. 
II.  OFF-LABEL USE OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
Before considering different universal healthcare models, it is important 
to establish a general understanding of off-label activity.  Off-label use has 
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k) (2000). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102 (Supp. IV 2004); see, e.g., Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. Supp. 
2d 1323, 1327-31 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (case concerning Florida’s refusal to cover certain off-
label uses under its state funded Medicaid program). 
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been defined as using a drug “for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, 
over a longer period of time, or for a population (such as children) different 
from that for which the drug has been approved.”7  Off-label use also 
includes “administering the drug in an unapproved method,”8 or using an 
unapproved formulation.9  While promotion of off-label uses is strongly 
regulated, doctors are free to prescribe drugs for unapproved uses, and 
many commonly do.10  The practice of off-label prescribing is particularly 
prevalent with cancer and HIV/AIDS patients, as well as in pediatrics, due to 
the fact that most medicines for chronic diseases are approved for adults 
only.11 
A. Off Label Use, Generally 
The rationale supporting off-label use relates to the idea that many 
patients are unable to wait for the FDA to approve a use of a drug that their 
doctor has found to be effective to treat certain diseases.12  Off-label drug 
use is also supported by the idea that the cost to drug companies to seek 
approval of secondary indications of an already approved drug is too 
high.13  On- or off-label, drug companies profit from the use of their drugs, 
so there is very little incentive to undertake this time-consuming and costly 
process.14  Additionally, since drug companies conduct clinical trials in 
order to seek approval for universal distribution for the first indication of a 
drug, the company may use a significantly more “conservative risk/benefit 
calculus” than that used by an individual doctor assessing the needs of a 
patient in order to expedite the approval process.15  In other words, the 
 
 7. Johnson, supra note 3, at 61. 
 8. Weeks, supra note 1, at 647; see also Sharon Conroy et al., Survey of Unlicensed 
and Off Label Drug Use in Paediatric Wards in European Countries, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 79, 79-
80 (2000). 
 9. Conroy et al., supra note 8. 
 10. Weeks, supra note 1, at 647. 
 11. Weeks, supra note 1, at 647-48; see generally Rosemary Roberts et al., Pediatric 
Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and Efficacy of Pediatric Therapies, 290 JAMA 905, 905 
(2003). 
 12. Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s 
Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 164 (2007). 
 13. See generally Johnson, supra note 3, at 69-71 (arguing that “the [federal] regulatory 
structure incentivizes pharmaceutical firms to seek a narrow approved use, at least initially, in 
order to minimize the delay to market and reduce the investment in research required to meet 
FDA standards for approval.”). 
 14. Id. at 67-71 (noting that “the FDCA encourages the proliferation of off-label uses” 
because once a drug is approved for a single purpose, it is available for physicians to 
prescribe any way they see fit). 
 15. Weeks, supra note 1, at 659. 
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doctor is generally in a far better position to determine whether an off-label 
drug works for a particular patient.  In fact, since the FDA considers the 
practice of medicine exclusively within the realm of the physician, and 
therefore out of its regulatory control, an off-label use that has proved 
effective in the treatment of various conditions is commonly accepted as 
standard practice by physicians.16  Some physicians even consider failure to 
prescribe drugs for known effective off-label uses as a potential malpractice 
liability.17 
Conversely, there is substantial concern about the risk of adverse 
reactions to off-label uses that are not scientifically validated by the FDA 
approval process.18  A recent study found that while off-label use is relatively 
common, some occurs without any evidence of “therapeutic efficacy.”19  
That study also pointed out that while many off-label uses “represent a 
logical extension of the FDA-approved indication,” some uses were 
nevertheless “distinctively different from those for which the drug was 
approved.”20  Even in situations where the drug is being used for the 
approved indication, off-label prescribing is common among untested 
populations, such as children, for whom the use of drugs only approved for 
adults could potentially present significant dangers.21  This is a cause for 
concern for policymakers as the primary goal of the FDA is patient 
welfare.22 
 
 16. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 68 (discussing how an off-label use of a drug can 
become the “customary standard of care” in certain circumstances, and noting that the FDA 
lacks the authority to regulate the prescribing practices of health care practitioners). 
 17. Weeks, supra note 1, at 648; see generally Johnson, supra note 3, at 68 (stating 
that, “[i]n fact, off-label use often becomes the customary standard of care in particular 
circumstances, with the result that doctors are at risk for malpractice liability for failure to 
prescribe an approved drug for an off-label use.”). 
 18. Weeks, supra note 1, at 658; David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among 
Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021, 1025 (2006) (observing 
that when off-label uses are similar to the approved indications, there is not much to be 
concerned about, but that some off-label uses are “for indications distinctly different from 
those for which the drug was approved”, which presents cause for concern over patient 
safety); see also Valérie Junod, Information et publicité pour les médicaments s’adressant aux 
Professionnells: les tribunaux Appliquent le droit de manière stricte, 88 BULLETIN DES MÉDECINS 
SUISSES 1399, 1402 (2007) available at www.saez.ch/pdf_f/2007/2007-34/2007-34-
427.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing the dangers of doctors not being able to access 
information on off-label uses of drugs they are prescribing). 
 19. Radley et al., supra note 18, at 1025. 
 20. Id. at 1025. 
 21. Johnson, supra note 3, at 82. 
 22. Weeks, supra note 1, at 658; see ENTERPRISE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 4, 8 (2000), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals/pharmacos/docs/brochure/brochurenov 
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B. Off-Label Prescribing Practices in the United States 
In the interest of patient safety, promotion of off-label uses was 
prohibited entirely in the U.S. until 1997, when Congress passed the Food 
and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA).23  FDAMA created a 
small exception for the dissemination of information by manufacturers about 
alternate uses of an already approved drug if that manufacturer was in the 
process of conducting trials for the new use, or if that manufacturer had 
already filed “a supplemental application to FDA for approval of the new 
use.”24  This privilege is narrow, however, and subject to significant 
restrictions.25  Among these restrictions are the rules that a manufacturer 
may only disseminate information that is considered “scientifically sound,” 
which can be demonstrated by publication in a peer-reviewed medical or 
scientific journal, or similar reference publication.26  Additionally, such 
information may only be disseminated to healthcare practitioners, pharmacy 
benefit managers, health insurance issuers, group health plans, or federal or 
state government agencies.27 
Given the fact that companies must still conduct clinical testing and seek 
approval from the FDA if they want to promote an off-label use, at least one 
author argues that many companies will not take advantage of the 
dissemination privilege granted by FDAMA.28  Clinical testing and approval 
application is a long and expensive process, and if drug companies can 
profit from the proliferation of off-label use of their products (through 
physician experimentation and word of mouth, among other methods), there 
may not be any incentive to seek approval for those off-label uses.29  From 
the perspective of the pharmaceutical industry, obtaining FDA approval for 
 
99.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing the similar goals of the European Union’s 
equivalent to the FDA, the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products). 
 23. Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-
115, § 401; see Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 781 (1962); see generally Weeks, 
supra note 1, at 653-54. 
 24. Weeks, supra note 1, at 650, 652; see 21 U.S.C § 360aaa(b)(1)(A) and (2000); see 
also Mitchell Oates, Note, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through Production and 
Disclosure of Research into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1284 
(2005). 
 25. 21 C.F.R. § 99.1 (2008); see Weeks, supra note 1, at 650-51. 
 26. 21 C.F.R. § 99.101(a); see also Weeks, supra note 1, at 650-51. 
 27. 21 C.F.R. § 99.1(a)(2) (2008); see also Weeks, supra note 1, at 650. 
 28. See generally Weeks, supra note 1, at 662 (arguing that the threat of sanctions and 
“the lack of additional economic incentives to seek FDA approval” will discourage companies 
from participating in the new dissemination procedure when they can still profit from 
“underground” promotion of off-label use of their drugs). 
 29. See id. at 663 (observing that “[m]anufacturers reap the economic benefits of 
increased sales of their products whether they are prescribed on- or off-label.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
238 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:233 
every possible use of a drug can be prohibitively expensive. 30  Currently, 
once a drug is approved for a relatively narrow use, it can be released into 
the market and off-label demand for it begins.31  Drug companies profit 
from the proliferation of information among doctors for off-label uses, which 
provides incentive from the market itself to not only approve drugs for very 
narrow indications (that is, the path of least resistance), but to disseminate 
information to doctors about off-label uses of their products by any means 
possible.32 
Further incentive for pharmaceutical companies to avoid conducting 
clinical tests on additional uses presents itself when patent protection of a 
drug does not last long enough to make such post-market testing 
profitable.33  Obtaining FDA approval takes a significant amount of time, 
thus making it impractical to obtain approval for every possible indication.34  
Further, once allowed into the stream of commerce, both brand name and 
generic drugs will be prescribed off-label.35  The fact that generic drugs are 
also prescribed for off-label uses has significant implications for any federal 
or state funded insurance program, where cutting costs it is important.  This 
desire to reduce costs may push insurers to cover only generic forms of 
drugs.  Thus, the incentives created for pharmaceutical companies by the 
market, insurers, and the current regulatory framework would seem to push 
those companies in the direction of promoting off-label use as a way of 
maximizing profits. 
The fact that many pharmaceutical companies are embroiled in 
litigation related to the illegal promotion of off-label uses suggests that 
regulations concerning off-label promotion have not been able to overcome 
the financial incentives the marketplace has created for finding ways to 
inform doctors about profitable off-label uses. 36  Off-label promotion is 
generally not blatant, taking the form, for example, of providing doctors with 
gifts, giving them discounts on certain drugs, discussions about off-label 
uses behind closed doors, and other subtle, but improper, steps to provide 
incentives for the doctor to prescribe a certain drug.37  Lawsuits filed against 
drug companies for illegal promotion of off-label indications have resulted 
 
 30. See id. at 662 (noting that “manufacturers may find the expense and effort of seeking 
new drug approval as a condition to dissemination of off-label information unjustified in 
comparison to the potential value of the approval.”). 
 31. Helm, supra note 12. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Weeks, supra note 1, at 663. 
 34. Johnson, supra note 3, at 69-71 (discussing low regulatory incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to seek broad approval of new drugs). 
 35. Helm, supra note 12. 
 36. Rockoff, supra note 3. 
 37. Id. 
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in those companies paying multi-million dollar settlements.38  Additionally, 
the federal False Claims Act has been employed repeatedly in cases where 
reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is 
involved.39  The prevalence of litigation seems to indicate that, in terms of 
influencing pharmaceutical company decisions, the market incentives to 
engage in off-label promotion outweigh the penalties associated with 
regulations that prohibit such activity.40  Even in cases where companies are 
self-regulated (i.e. they have internal compliance programs to combat 
illegal promotion activities), there is evidence that off-label promotion still 
occurs with alarming frequency.41  Efforts at self-regulation have been 
stepped up in recent months in light of the fact that drug companies 
continue to face litigation for illegal marketing practices, but not enough 
time has passed to determine if these measures will be effective at curbing 
this behavior.42  As a report issued by Consumers International, a consumer 
protection organization based in London, argues, “the sheer volume of 
reported breaches indicates that even the companies with apparently the 
most comprehensive compliance programmes are not fully effective in 
preventing breaches of marketing codes.  This problem extends to the 
biggest companies, such as GSK [GlaxoSmithKline] and Pfizer.”43 
 
 38. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Will Pay $515 Million to Settle Pricing, Marketing 
Allegations, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1028 (Oct. 5, 2007); 
Company Admits Drug Misbranding, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 
746 (July 20, 2007); OxyContin Maker Will Pay $19.5 Million, Modify Marketing, in 
Settlement with States, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 486 (May 11, 
2007); Cell Therapeutics to Pay $10.5 Million to Resolve Illegal Drug Marketing Charges, 5 
Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 410 (Apr. 20, 2007) (all discussing 
settlements made by drug companies for violations of marketing laws). 
 39. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 101-17 (discussing the use of the FCA to garner a 
settlement of $455 million over off-label use of the drug Neurontin). 
 40. See id. at 66 (noting that continued off-label prescribing suggests that litigation for 
violations for seems to show the insignificance of the impact of such litigation). 
 41. Sarah Boseley, Kickbacks, Cartels and Chatrooms: How Unscrupulous Drug Firms 
Woo the Public, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 26, 2006, at www.guardian.co.uk/society/ 
2006/jun/26/health.medicineandhealth1/print (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 42. See Gardiner Harris, Drug Industry to Announce Revised Code on Marketing, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2008, at C4 (discussing new voluntary guidelines established by the 
pharmaceutical industry which ban giving doctors gifts as a promotional tool). 
 43. CONSUMERS INT’L, BRANDING THE CURE: A CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, DRUG PROMOTION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN EUROPE 26 -27 
(June 2006) available at www.consumersinternational.org/Shared_ASP_Files/Uploaded 
Files/ECD91B6F-FE37-45C0-AE34-898BFB39C700_BrandingtheCure-fullreport.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
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C. Off-Label Prescribing Practices in the United Kingdom 
The Consumers International report demonstrates that illegal off-label 
promotion practices are not isolated to the United States.  Although 
Europe’s regulatory structure seems more complicated than that of the 
United States, the regulations are essentially the same.44  The European 
Union (EU) established the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products, commonly referred to as the European Medicines Evaluation 
Agency (EMEA), which has roughly the same responsibilities as the FDA, but 
at a supranational level.45  However, EMEA approval is not the only way a 
drug can be approved for use in the EU.  National regulatory agencies can 
also approve drugs for use and then go through an application to have the 
approval mutually recognized by other Member States.46  Nevertheless, a 
Union-wide Directive issued by the Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union states that “Member States shall prohibit any advertising of 
a medicinal product in respect of which a marketing authorization has not 
been granted in accordance with Community law.”47  This Directive is 
bolstered by international trade associations that establish self-regulation 
mechanisms for member pharmaceutical companies which restrict 
promotion of non-approved drug uses.48 
As a member of the European Union, the United Kingdom (U.K.) is 
subject to the oversight of the EMEA.49  There is a significant amount of off-
label use in the U.K. just as there is in the United States, particularly in 
pediatric medicine.50  In the U.K., such practice is commonly referred to as 
 
 44. Compare Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 
2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 at art. 87 with Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 
(FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 401; see Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 781 
(1962) and 21 C.F.R. § 99 (2008). 
 45. ENTERPRISE DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, supra note 22, at 7. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 
2001 on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal Products for Human Use, 2001 O.J. (L 
311) 67 at art. 87. 
 48. See INT’L FED’N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MFRS. & ASS’NS, CODE OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
MARKETING PRACTICES 7 (2006 Revision), available at www.ifpma.org/pdf/IFPMA-TheCode-
FinalVersion-30May2006-EN.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also EUROPEAN FED’N OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUS. AND ASS’NS, CODE ON THE PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION-ONLY 
MEDICINES TO, AND INTERACTIONS WITH, HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 7 (2007), available at 
www.efpia.org/Objects/2/Files/code%20medicines%202007.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 49. European Medicines Agency, About EMEA – Structure, at www.emea.europa.eu/ 
htms/aboutus/emeaoverview.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 50. See S. Conroy et al., Unlicensed and Off Label Drug Use in Acute Lymphoblastic 
Leukaemia and Other Malignancies in Children, 14 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 42, 42 (2003) 
(finding that “[n]inety per cent of babies in neonatal intensive care receive unlicensed or off 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] WILL EVERYONE GET THEIR BEST MEDICINE? 241 
prescribing “unlicensed” drugs rather than “off-label use,” which extends the 
definition of the practice to include prescribing drugs that are not approved 
for any particular use at all, such as caffeine.51  While promotion of off-
label indications is regulated extensively by the EU authorities, ensuring safe, 
effective and affordable healthcare is the responsibility of the Member 
States.52  The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) is the British equivalent of the FDA and is responsible for approving 
various drug indications.53  Managing authorities such as National Health 
Service (NHS) Trusts54 or individual medical practices may further regulate 
and even prohibit off-label prescribing.55  Additionally, the National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) identifies and makes recommendations to the 
national healthcare authorities regarding which treatments are most effective 
and cost-efficient for patients.56 
While healthcare professionals in the U.K. believe that drug safety and 
efficacy are important, licensing status was only ranked tenth out of twelve 
choices in a survey of healthcare professionals addressing the prioritization 
of pediatric medication.57  This relative lack of concern about licensing 
status seems to reflect the same attitude that American doctors often have 
 
label drugs; 65% of prescriptions are unlicensed of off label.  Seventy per cent of children in 
paediatric intensive care receive unlicensed or off label drugs.”); see also Ian Wong et al., 
Paediatric Medicines Research in the UK: How to Move Forward?, 26 DRUG SAFETY 529, 530 
(2003) (observing that “[t]here have been numerous studies to show that many of the 
medicines used in children are used off-label or are unlicensed for use in children.”). 
 51. P. Hill, Off Licence and Off Label Prescribing in Children: Litigation Fears for 
Physicians, 90 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD (SUPPLEMENT 1) i17, i17 (2005); Conroy et 
al., supra note 50. 
 52. See Markus Hartmann & Florence Hartmann-Vareilles, Recent Developments in 
European Pharmaceutical Law 2004: A Legal Point of View, 39 DRUG INFO. J. 193, 203-04 
(2005), available at www.diahome.org/NR/rdonlyres/39B6663D-0BA9-4666-A7F9-D598E 
851442E/0/DIJ39_2_193.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing how “public health 
remains a subject of complex national and inter-Member-State actions” and how Member 
States can decide the degree to which they will protect public health within the confines of the 
EC treaty). 
 53. Hill, supra note 51, at i17; see also Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency, at www.mhra.gov.uk/index.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 54. For an explanation of NHS Trusts, see National Health Service, About the NHS: NHS 
Authorities and Trusts, at www.nhs.uk/aboutnhs/howtheNHSworks/authoritiesandtrusts/Pages/ 
Authoritiesandtrusts.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 55. Hill, supra note 51, at i17. 
 56. Andrew Dillon et al., The National Institute for Clinical Excellence and Coverage of 
Relenza by the NHS, in INFORMING JUDGMENT: CASE STUDIES OF HEALTH POLICY AND RESEARCH 
IN SIX COUNTRIES 137, 144, 146, (2001). 
 57. Wong et al., supra note 50, at 531 tbl.1 (noting that safety, efficacy and 
characteristics of the disease, among other factors, ranked above licensing status as “most 
relevant when prescribing paediatric medications”). 
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regarding prescribing off-label.  Further, the Consumers International Report 
shows that pharmaceutical companies approach the market in the U.K. the 
same way they do in the U.S., knowing that there is a significant market for 
off-label use.58 
D. Off-Label Prescribing Practices in Switzerland 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, and thus is not subject to the 
approval process of the EMEA or the directives of the Parliament and the 
Council.59  The Swiss Agency for Therapeutic Products, otherwise known as 
Swiss Medic, is the Swiss equivalent of the FDA and the MHRA, and 
oversees how new drugs are approved and promoted in Switzerland.60  
Switzerland has laws similar to those of the U.S. and the EU prohibiting the 
dissemination of information regarding unapproved uses of medicines.61  
The Loi sur les produits thérapeutiques (LPTh) (Law on Therapeutic Products) 
and l’Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les médicaments (OPMéd) 
(Ordinance on the Advertising of Medicines) strictly regulate communication 
by pharmaceutical companies directed toward physicians pertaining to new 
drugs.62  Article 2, letter (a) of OPMéd defines publicité (“advertising”) as 
“toute forme d’information, de prospection ou d’incitation qui vise à 
encourager la prescription, la remise, la vente, la consommation ou 
l’utilisation de médicaments” (that is, any form of information, canvassing, 
or inducement designed to promote the prescription, delivery, sale, 
consumption or use of a drug).63  This provision has been interpreted to 
even include messages that are purely informative and objective if they have 
 
 58. CONSUMERS INT’L, supra note 43. 
 59. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications 
Office, Background Note: Switzerland, at “History”, at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3431.htm 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 60. Swissmedic, Our Core Business: About Swissmedic: Swissmedic, at www.swiss 
medic.ch/en/industrie/overall.asp?theme=0.00098.00001&theme_id=512 (last visited Jan. 
3, 2009). 
 61. See generally Junod, supra note 18, at 1399 (a Swiss article discussing [in French] 
three 2006 decisions on off-label promotion of drugs in Switzerland rendered by the 
Commission recours pour les produits thérapeutiques [Appeals Committee for Therapeutic 
Products] under the loi sur les produits thérapeutiques [law on Therapeutic Products] and 
l’Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les medicaments [Ordinance on the Advertising of 
Medications]). 
 62. Id. at 1400; Federal Law on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices (Law on 
Therapeutic Products - LTP), arts. 31-33 (2007) (Switz.); Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les 
médicaments [OPMéd] [Ordinance on the Advertising of Medicines] Oct. 17, 2001, 
812.212.5 art. 2.a (Switz.). 
 63. Ordonnance sur la publicité pour les medicaments [OPMéd] [Ordinance on the 
Advertising of Medicines] Oct. 17, 2001, 812.212.5 art. 2.a (Switz.). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] WILL EVERYONE GET THEIR BEST MEDICINE? 243 
the effect of increasing sales.64  In order to avoid the label of “advertising,” 
and thus falling into a category of communication subject to strict regulation 
and often prohibited, a communication from a pharmaceutical company 
cannot identify any certain drug or any particular class of drugs.65  However, 
manufacturers are required to communicate information to physicians 
regarding the safety and efficacy of their drugs, and this communication is 
considered legal as long as it does not result in increased drug sales.66  The 
central idea is that no information can be disseminated which could have 
the effect of increasing sales and therefore producing profit for the drug 
companies.67 
As is the case in many other countries, off-label drug use is common in 
Switzerland, particularly in pediatrics.68  While Swiss off-label promotion 
laws are stricter than those in the U.S., physicians still maintain prescribing 
freedom in Switzerland.69  SwissMedic only approves the marketing of a 
drug for the indications of that drug which have been verified by a thorough 
evaluation of pharmaceutical interest, quality, and the overall safety of the 
drug.70  Similarly, drug makers are not allowed to disseminate any 
information that is outside the scope of the drug’s approval, including any 
favorable results of clinical studies on non-approved uses, even if those 
results are incontestable.71  Further, SwissMedic forbids communication 
about non-approved uses on Swiss public internet sites.72  If a manufacturer 
wants to publicize such information, it must first seek modification of the 
drug’s approved indications from SwissMedic, a stricter regulation than 
FDAMA’s requirement that a company be simply actively seeking approval 
of the off-label indication before disseminating such information.73 
Since doctors are free to prescribe drugs as they wish, there is concern 
that the prohibition of publicizing positive results of drug studies will prevent 
a physician from gaining a complete understanding of the drugs he or she 
 
 64. Junod, supra note 18, at 1400. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1400, 1403 n.12. 
 67. See id. at 1401 (noting that the practice of off-label prescribing is legal in 
Switzerland). 
 68. Ermindo R. Di Paolo et al., Unlicensed and Off-Label Drug Use in a Swiss Paediatric 
University Hospital: A Pilot Study, 136 SWISS MED. WKLY. 218, 220, 221 (2006). 
 69. Junod, supra note 18, at 1401. 
 70. E.R. Di Paolo et al., Incidence des prescriptions hors autorisation de mise sur le 
marché dans le département médico-chirurgical de pédiatrie d’un chu Suisse, Congrès annuel 
de la Société Suisse de Pédiatrie, Davos, June 26-28, 2003, available at www.chuv.ch/pha/ 
pha_poster_ssp-amm.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 71. Junod, supra note 18, at 1400. 
 72. Id. at 1402. 
 73. Id. at 1401; see also supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
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prescribes.74  In light of the common off-label uses of many drugs, and the 
concerns surrounding such uses, SwissMedic has taken measures to 
promote increased approval for off-label and unlicensed drugs, particularly 
those used in pediatrics.75  One notable action that SwissMedic has taken is 
to extend the patent protection for pharmaceutical companies who 
voluntarily research uses of drugs that are currently used off-label in 
children.76  Since inadequate patent protection is one of the factors that 
arguably contributes to the reluctance of pharmaceutical companies to seek 
approval of off-label indications,77 this protection may lead to a reduction in 
the prevalence of off-label and unlicensed drug use in Switzerland. 
Given that physician autonomy is consistently honored in Switzerland,78 
as well as in the U.K., it seems off-label prescribing will remain a common 
practice in the absence of significant changes to the regulatory framework of 
these countries.  The frequency of off-label prescribing complicates how 
insurance providers differentiate between drugs that will and will not be 
covered.  This uncertainty is particularly relevant to government-funded 
insurance programs, where cost is an important concern.  In the United 
States, voters are significantly divided on this issue.  Some believe that the 
government should provide everyone with affordable healthcare, while 
others worry about how such an approach would be financed, and whether 
the government is really capable of providing adequate healthcare coverage 
on such a large scale.79  This concern already puts any potential American 
universal healthcare system in a vice, particularly with regard to prescription 
drug coverage, as legislators grapple with how to provide efficient coverage 
that keeps costs low while maintaining superior quality for all patients. 
 
 74. Junod, supra note 18, at 1401. 
 75. Di Paolo et al., supra note 70, at 220. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Weeks, supra note 1, at 663 (discussing the shorter patent life of secondary 
indications). 
 78. See Junod, supra note 18, at 1401 (noting that off-label prescribing is legal in 
Switzerland and often conforms to the standards of good medicine); see also Weeks, supra 
note 1, at 647 (noting how the FDA “has disavowed any authority to regulate the off-label 
prescribing practices of individual physicians.”); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 68-69 
(discussing how  an off-label use of a drug can become “the customary standard of care” in 
certain circumstances, and how the FDA lacks the authority “to ‘limit or interfere with the 
authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed 
[medical] device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care 
practitioner-patient relationship.’”). 
 79. Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Most Support U.S. Guarantee of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 2007, at A1. 
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III.  GOVERNMENT FUNDED HEALTHCARE 
A. Government Funded Insurance in the United States 
In the U.S., the concept of government-funded healthcare is relatively 
foreign, compared to other countries.80 Currently, federal programs such as 
Medicare and Medicaid are two of the primary ways that the U.S. 
government funds healthcare.  These programs provide health insurance to 
senior citizens, disabled individuals, and the poor.81  Together, Medicare 
and Medicaid provide medical and prescription drug coverage to 
approximately eighty million people.82  Because Medicare and Medicaid 
provide healthcare coverage for approximately one third of the U.S. 
population,83 these programs are good models to examine when 
considering how an American universal healthcare regime might be 
structured. 
Medicare and Medicaid present two different ways in which the 
government works to reconcile the competing goals of patient welfare and 
cost containment in the context of reimbursement for off-label drug use.  
Since off-label use is not an exclusively American phenomenon, this note 
will consider the approaches used in the U.K. and Switzerland to balance 
patient welfare and cost containment in an effort to analyze how those 
approaches may provide a model for the United States.  Healthcare in the 
U.K. emphasizes cost-effectiveness, as scarce healthcare resources must be 
rationed among many patients, all of whom receive free healthcare at the 
point of service.84  Switzerland mandates that every individual who can 
afford to buy comprehensive health insurance does so, and the cost of the 
premium is set by the government in an effort to “bring more solidarity” to 
 
 80. See The University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Business, ‘Harry and Louise,’ 
the Sequel?  The Universal Health Care Debate is Back, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,  June 27, 
2007, at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1761 (last visited Jan. 3, 
2009) (discussing how public opinion has affected prospects for universal healthcare in the 
United States, and how the views of American citizens compare with those of citizens of 
countries with strong universal healthcare systems). 
 81. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965); see 
also Alma Koch, Financing Health Systems, in INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH SERVICES 76, 78 
(Stephen J. Williams & Paul R. Torrens eds., 7th ed. 2007). 
 82. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER 
INCOME 20 (2007). 
 83. Koch, supra note 81, at 78; see Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: 
The United States, at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2009) (As of July 2008, the population of the U.S. was estimated to be 
303,824,640). 
 84. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 144, 146. 
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the Swiss healthcare system.85  Since the government subsidizes the cost of 
healthcare for citizens who cannot afford it, and since the government feels 
pressure from voters to keep premiums low, cost-containment is an 
important issue for the Swiss government.86  An examination of the British 
and Swiss healthcare systems indicates how cost-effectiveness may affect 
coverage for off-label prescription drugs, and provides lessons that may be 
incorporated into an American healthcare system. 
1. Medicare 
Medicare is a federal program designed to provide healthcare services 
to senior citizens and disabled individuals.87  Designed as a federal 
entitlement program, Medicare was established by the Social Security Act of 
1965 and helps pay for hospital stays, outpatient treatment, and 
prescription drugs.88  Medicare is divided into four parts: Part A covers 
hospital insurance benefits,89 Part B covers outpatient therapies administered 
in a doctor’s office,90 Part C covers the Medicare+Choice Program,91 and 
Part D covers a voluntary prescription drug benefit.92  Part D was established 
under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), and stipulates that 
prescription drug coverage be designed and administered by private 
insurance Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) that are then reimbursed by the 
government.93  Unlike Parts A and B, Part D is not standardized, giving 
individual private health insurance providers the freedom to determine what 
drugs they will cover, as long as those drugs are not specifically excluded 
from coverage by Medicare.94 
Chemotherapy and other outpatient drug treatments that are 
administered at a doctor’s office are covered under Part B.95  As nearly fifty 
percent of the uses of anticancer chemotherapy drugs are off-label, 
Congress has had to address the issue of off-label use under this part of 
 
 85. Interview by Frontline with Pascal Couchepin, President of Switzerland (Oct. 30, 
2007) at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sickaroundtheworld/interviews/couchepin.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Couchepin Interview]. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Koch, supra note 81, at 78. 
 88. Id. at 86-90; see also Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 
Stat. 286 (1965). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c - 1395i-5 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j - 1395w-4 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21 - 1395w-28 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 93. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 781-85 (6th ed. 
2008); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 94. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 782-83. 
 95. Id. at 777; 42 U.S.C. § 1395k(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
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Medicare.96  Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA) in 1993, which required Medicare to cover off-label uses of 
anticancer drugs included in designated medical compendia.97  OBRA 
works in conjunction with the provisions of the Social Security Act (SSA) 
which require that Medicare cover drugs for both FDA-approved indications 
and off-label uses supported in the American Hospital Formulary Service-
Drug Information98 or in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia-Drug Information.99  The 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) may designate additional 
compendia as references that support certain off-label uses, as well as 
identify peer-reviewed medical journals that may offer guidance to Medicare 
contractors about off-label uses that are supported by clinical data.100 
Under Part D, the Medicare statute references the provisions of the 
Medicaid statute that cover drugs approved by the FDA and those that were 
in use before 1962, but does not refer directly to the definition of “medically 
necessary” that requires consulting the three compendia.101  If this part of 
the Medicare statute is to be interpreted explicitly, it would only cover FDA-
approved drugs.102  A report issued by a patients’ rights group shows how 
such a strict interpretation of the statute under the Bush administration 
resulted in the loss of coverage for some people of off-label uses that were 
covered prior to switching to Medicare’s Part D plan.103 
Even when the statute is read more inclusively, Part D still only covers 
FDA-approved drugs and drugs that are found in one of the three 
 
 96. Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer Treatment: Coverage of Off-
Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3206, 3206 (2006). 
 97. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 1107 Stat. 312 (1993); § 13553, 107 Stat. 591-92; Am. Soc’y 
of Clinical Oncology, supra note 96. 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); Am. Soc’y of Health-System Pharmacists, AHFS Drug 
Information: Off-Label Use, at www.ahfsdruginformation.com/off_label/index.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2009). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention, USP-NF-An 
Overview, at www.usp.org/USPNF/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also Am. Soc’y Clinical 
Oncology, supra note 96, at 3206 (noting that the even though the statute references the 
American Medical Association Drug Evaluation, this third compendium has been merged into 
the U.S. Pharmacopeia-Drug Information). 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2) (2000); Am. Soc’y Clinical Oncology, supra note 96, at 
3207. 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e) (Supp. IV 2004); Part D Denial of Access to ‘Off-Label’ 
Drugs Based on Misreading of Statute, Report Says, 5 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) 
No. 32, at 834 (Aug. 10, 2007); MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., OFF-BASE: THE EXCLUSION OF OFF-
LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS FROM MEDICARE PART D COVERAGE 7 (2007), available at www.medicare 
rights.org/Off-label_PartD_Coverage.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 102. MEDICARE RIGHTS CTR., supra note 101. 
 103. Id. 
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compendia cited in the Medicaid statute.104  However, there is no means for 
compendia expansion by the Secretary of HHS under Part D as there is 
under Part B.105  According to one patient advocacy group, Part D is 
significantly narrower in its coverage of off-label use, and it lacks any sort of 
effective appeal procedure when a patient is denied coverage.106 
This difficulty with coverage of off-label uses under Part D is the subject 
of a recent complaint filed in the Southern District of New York against 
Michael O. Leavitt, in his official capacity as the Secretary of HHS.107  The 
complainant, Judith Layzer, was a cancer survivor who has used the drug 
Cetrotide off-label since 1999 to treat and limit her cancer.108  This off-label 
use of the drug was covered by Ms. Layzer’s employer sponsored insurance 
before she switched to prescription drug coverage under Part D, at which 
point, she was faced with the option of no coverage or, alternatively, co-
payments exceeding $7,000.109  The complaint alleged that the Secretary of 
HHS was wrong in determining that the complainant’s off-label use of 
Cetrotide was unlawful because it was not FDA-approved or included in one 
of the three compendia, despite her doctors’ repeated statements regarding 
the medical necessity of the drug to treat her cancer.110  When Layzer 
appealed the initial denial of her coverage to the Office of Medicare 
Hearings and Appeals, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that heard her 
case admitted that the medical necessity of her therapy had “been firmly 
established by three prominent and highly qualified physicians who [were] 
familiar with” complainant’s “uniquely serious medical condition”, but 
nevertheless had to rule that coverage was not covered by Medicare Part 
D.111  The ALJ noted that peer-reviewed literature supported the use of 
Cetrotide to treat ovarian cancer, and that his ruling created a discrepancy 
in Medicare coverage as the use would have been covered under Part B.112 
Whether interpreted strictly or more broadly, by considering everything 
covered by the Medicaid statute, off-label prescription drug coverage is 
 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e) (Supp. IV 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(2)-(6) (2000); 
Letter from Medicare Access for Patients Rx to Max Baucus, Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman, United States Senate (Nov. 15, 2007) available at www.medicarerights.org/ 
maprxlettertobaucus.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009), [hereinafter MAPRx Letter]. 
 105. Patient Advocates Urge Changes to Medicare to Allow Broader Coverage of Off-Label 
Drugs, 46 Pharmaceutical L. & Industry Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1233 (Nov. 30, 2007). 
 106. MAPRx Letter, supra note 104. 
 107. Complaint at 1-3, Judith M. Layzer & Ray J. Fischer v. Michael O. Leavitt, No. 07-
CV-11339 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007). 
 108. Id. at 3. 
 109. Id. at 8-9. 
 110. See id. at 7, 18-19. 
 111. Id. at 10. 
 112. Complaint at 10, Judith M. Layzer & Ray J. Fischer v. Michael O. Leavitt, No. 07-CV-
11339 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007). 
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significantly limited by the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit.113  
Unlike Part B, which is provided by Medicare directly and is funded through 
beneficiary premiums and general revenue funds,114 Part D benefits are 
provided by private PDPs, which are awarded contracts with HHS based on 
their bids for various coverage areas.115  The PDPs are only required to meet 
certain minimum coverage conditions, but other terms and conditions can 
be negotiated with HHS; consequently, plans can vary from the “standard 
coverage” elements listed in the legislation as long as they substitute 
“actuarially equivalent” coverage.116 
Since PDPs must bid to receive contracts from HHS to provide 
prescription drug coverage,117 and are thus significantly influenced by 
market forces, it seems unlikely that they will offer coverage of drugs that are 
not explicitly required by Medicare and which cost more than the benefit the 
PDP would derive from covering the drug.  This idea is evidenced by the fact 
that off-label coverage is much more inclusive under Part B (which is 
provided directly by Medicare)118 than it is under Part D. 
2. Medicaid 
The Medicaid program was established as a joint federal-state funded 
welfare program to assist states with healthcare costs for the poor.119  
Although “states are not required to participate in [Medicaid], if a state 
chooses to do so, it must comply with federal statutory and regulatory 
requirements” for mandatory services.120 Coverage for outpatient 
prescription drugs is an optional service, but as with all optional Medicaid 
programs, “once a state elects to provide an optional service, that service 
becomes part of the state Medicaid plan and is subject to the requirements 
 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e) (Supp. IV 2004); see also MAPRx Letter, supra note 104 
(stating that “Medicare regulations are overly stringent.  They exclude Part D coverage of 
medications—no matter how medically necessary—when they are prescribed for uses that are 
not listed on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) label or supported by a citation in 
one of three specific medical compendia.”). 
 114. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER 16 (2008), available at 
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 115. FURROW ET AL., supra note 93, at 782. 
 116. Id. at 783. 
 117. Id. at 782. 
 118. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER 16 (2008), available at 
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. 
Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
 120. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1326; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
250 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:233 
of federal law.”121  All states currently offer Medicaid prescription drug 
benefits.122 
Medicaid covers “medically accepted indication[s]” of “any use for a 
covered outpatient drug.”123  “Medically accepted” is defined as a use 
which is approved by the FDA, or a non-FDA approved use which is 
supported by citation in one of three approved compendia.124  In addition to 
subjecting a covered outpatient drug to prior authorization, there are four 
other ways a state Medicaid agency may exclude drugs outside of this 
definition from coverage: 
1. Prescribed use is not for a medically accepted indication (either FDA 
approved or supported by citation in a compendium); 
2. Drug is listed as a restricted drug in § 1396r-8(d)(2) or is subsequently 
determined by the Secretary of HHS by regulation to be subject to 
clinical abuse or inappropriate use; 
3. Drug is subject to restriction pursuant to an agreement between the state 
and drug manufacturer; or 
4. Drug has been excluded by a state-established formulary, which is a list 
of Medicaid eligible drugs for which the state will provide reimbursement 
when prescribed for medically accepted indications.125 
If a state decides to require prior authorization of an excluded drug, 
there are two means by which it can do so: pursuant to the state’s formulary 
or as authorized directly by the Medicaid Act.126  Under the former option, if 
a doctor wishes to prescribe a drug that has been excluded under the state’s 
formulary, he or she can “contact the state, convey medical information 
specific to the patient, and perhaps obtain an exception to the exclusion for 
the requested drug (and thus obtain reimbursement for that drug).”127  
However, the doctor’s request can be denied by the state, making the state 
“the final authority over coverage of non-formulary drugs.”128  Thus, states 
 
 121. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (11th Cir. 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
1396d(a)(12) (2000 & Supp IV 2004). 
 122. Dawn M. Gencarelli, Medicaid Prescription Drug Coverage: State Efforts to Control 
Costs, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y F. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 790 (George Washington U., Wash. D.C.), May 
10, 2003, at 3, available at http://nhpf.ags.com/pdfs_ib/IB790_StateRx_5-10-03.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(k)(6), (k)(2)(A) (2000). 
 124. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6) (2000). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(B)(i)-(iv) (2000). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)-(5) (2000). 
 127. Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. 
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can restrict the coverage of off-label drug uses to a greater degree than the 
Medicaid Act does alone. 
The second type of prior authorization program was established by the 
Medicaid Act itself.  Under this approach, when a doctor wishes to prescribe 
a drug that requires prior authorization, he or she must first contact the state 
pharmacist who then shares information with the doctor about possible 
alternatives that are equally effective but less costly.129  Ultimately, however, 
the doctor’s right to prescribe the original drug is guaranteed one hundred 
percent as long as he or she calls the state pharmacist.130  Just having this 
added means of communicating equally effective and less costly drug 
remedies has produced “substantial cost savings for organizations 
purchasing large volumes of drugs.”131  In this sense, prior authorization 
cannot be used to deny coverage of off-label uses that are approved under 
the Medicaid Act, as can be done in situations where prior authorization is 
tied to a state formulary.132  Rather, a state can only condition coverage on 
the doctor making the call to the state pharmacist.133 
The issue of whether a state can deny coverage under its Medicaid laws 
after establishing a certain type of prior approval procedure was recently 
litigated in Florida.  In Edmonds v. Levine, the refusal of Florida’s Medicaid 
agency to “cover off-label drugs cited in any of the drug compendia unless 
they are supported by double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical 
trials” was found to violate the Medicaid Act.134  Florida had not established 
a drug formulary.  Therefore, prior authorization procedures were based on 
the Medicaid Act, which does not allow for outright denial of a covered 
drug.135  In this case, the Florida Medicaid agency tried to condition 
approval on results similar to what would be required for FDA approval, 
which was more than the state is allowed to do.136 
Under the Medicaid Act, a state may limit drugs which would normally 
be covered under Medicaid by excluding the drugs from the state formulary, 
as long as the excluded drug “‘does not have a significant, clinically 
meaningful therapeutic advantage in terms of safety, effectiveness, or 
 
 129. Id. at 1329. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.; see also Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of America v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 
1198 (11th Cir. 2002) (discussing Florida’s drug formulary and the impact of requiring 
physicians to call the state pharmacist, concluding that “[d]uring the first three months of the 
program, approximately 55 percent of all…calls…resulted in a change of the prescription to a 
drug on the preferred drug list.”). 
 132. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1329. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1336. 
 135. Id. at 1329. 
 136. See Weeks, supra note 1, at 655 (discussing FDA clinical trial requirements). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
252 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 2:233 
clinical outcome’ over other drugs included in the formulary.”137  However, 
if a state does not establish a formulary, coverage defaults to the Medicaid 
Act, which covers all FDA-approved indications and those which are 
included in one of the three compendia.138  This seems to focus mostly on 
the best remedy for the patient, while still giving the states relative autonomy 
regarding what they will choose to cover based on their individual budgets 
and plan structures. 
3. Socialized Medicine in the United Kingdom 
Healthcare in the U.K. is publicly financed through “non-earmarked 
general taxation and national insurance contributions” which are allocated 
by the National Health Service (NHS).139  These funding sources cover most 
healthcare services at the point of delivery; prescription drugs are covered 
by flat-rate charges, “although the majority of users qualify for exemption 
from prescription drug charges.”140  In England, general practices (GPs) 
provide primary healthcare services under contracts between the 
independent practitioners and the NHS.141  GPs are paid on a capitation 
basis and this income is supplemented by a Basic Practice Allowance.142  
Hospital services are provided through NHS Trusts, which employ the entire 
staff of the hospital.143 
Traditionally, doctors’ decisions in the U.K. have remained largely free 
from government control, but the establishment of the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1999 has led to increased regulation of 
clinical practices.144  The aim of NICE is to identify the practices that make 
the best use of resources and how those resources can be rationed in the 
healthcare system.145  NICE advises on the cost-effective use of NHS 
resources and establishes clinical guidelines and a framework for clinical 
governance.146  NICE has faced resistance from the pharmaceutical 
 
 137. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1328 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(4)(C) (2000)). 
 138. See  Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28 (discussing how inclusion of a drug in a 
state formulary is the only way a state can unilaterally exclude an indication which would 
otherwise be considered medically accepted under federal law). 
 139. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 141; National Health Service, About the NHS, at 
www.nhs.uk/aboutnhs/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 140. Dillion et al., supra note 56, at 141. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 142. 
 145. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 138. 
 146. Tom Walley et al., An Integrated National Pharmaceutical Policy for the United 
Kingdom?, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1523, 1524 (2000). 
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industry, which claims that NICE decisions undermine “the continued 
existence of the pharmaceutical industry in the United Kingdom.”147 
A significant issue in any universal healthcare system is how to keep 
coverage high and costs low, as there is only so much money to cover 
everyone.  The U.K. provides a model of this struggle with respect to 
prescription drugs because the cost of prescription drugs has increased, 
while widespread exemptions from drug co-payments have effectively 
assigned the burden of this additional cost to the NHS.148  In the U.K., 
prescription drugs are covered by a fixed co-payment of around £6.00 per 
prescription, but many people are exempt from this charge.149  A significant 
portion of the NHS budget is therefore spent on pharmaceuticals, and 
notable increases in the amount that NHS spends on pharmaceuticals 
relative to other budget items has raised concern in recent years.150  As a 
result, commentators in the U.K. have called for analysis of cost-
effectiveness before NHS decides whether or not to pay for a new drug.151 
Just like in the U.S., drug approval in the U.K. is based on proof of the 
drug’s safety and efficacy.152 Subsequent to this approval, NICE 
recommends whether a drug should be publicly funded based on both 
clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, taking into consideration how 
the drug will impact a patient’s quality of care compared with the cost of the 
drug relative to available alternatives.153  The guidance promulgated by 
NICE to NHS is meant to standardize healthcare across the country and end 
problems such as “rationing by postcode”, that is, “uneven access in 
geographical areas”.154  Once NICE decides to recommend a medicine, 
“the NHS is legally obliged to fund and resource” that medicine.155 
The role of NICE in approving drugs and devices reflects the onset of 
new data requirements that have arisen generally in European countries as 
a means of efficient healthcare delivery (including effectiveness, cost-
 
 147. Id. at 1523. 
 148. EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN 
TRANSITION: UNITED KINGDOM 82 (1999), available at www.euro.who.int/document/ 
e68283.pdf (last visited Jan. 3 2009) [hereinafter EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY REPORT]. 
 149. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 142. 
 150. Id.  NHS allocates over twelve percent of its annual budget to cover this difference.  
Id. 
 151. Id. at 143. 
 152. Id. at 152. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Dillon et al., supra note 56, at 138; National Health Service, National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence, About Technology Appraisals, at www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/ 
whatwedo/abouttechnologyappraisals/about_technology_appraisals.jsp (last visited Jan. 3, 
2009) [hereinafter NICE Appraisals]. 
 155. NICE Appraisals, supra note 154. 
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effectiveness and budgetary impact).156  This trend is further demonstrated 
by the fact that there is a “Limited List” in the U.K.—a list of drugs that have 
been excluded from NHS prescribing on the grounds of “poor therapeutic 
value or excessive cost.”157  Taking into account both clinical and cost-
effectiveness could likely lead to the exclusion of off-label treatments that 
are found lacking in such a cross-analysis. 
4. Mandatory Health Insurance in Switzerland 
Some have suggested that the Swiss system of universal healthcare 
would be the best model for the United States to follow when structuring its 
own universal healthcare system.158  Switzerland is a democratic, capitalist 
country that is not a member of the European Union, and since 1994 it has 
had a system of healthcare that requires every citizen have health 
insurance.159  For those who can afford it, the government has set a uniform 
flat premium rate at the equivalent of $750 for individual basic 
comprehensive coverage, and for those who cannot afford to pay for the 
premium, the government subsidizes the cost.160  Swiss law prohibits 
insurance companies from making a profit on basic insurance coverage, but 
allows more competition for supplemental insurance, such as dental 
coverage.161 
The societal view in Switzerland is that everyone has a right to high 
quality healthcare, just as one would have a right to education or a legal 
defense in the United States.162  For this right, citizens of Switzerland pay 
more for their health insurance than citizens of any other European 
country.163  But while Swiss citizens commonly protest the rising cost of 
premiums, they still spend substantially less on healthcare than Americans 
do, almost no one ever goes bankrupt due to medical bills, and everyone, 
 
 156. See Mark J. C. Nuijten & Joszef Kosa, Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: Assessing the 
Pricing Potential by a Pricing Matrix Model, 2 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 110, 110 (2004). 
 157. EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY REPORT, supra note 148, at 82. 
 158. See Julie Rovner, In Switzerland, A Health Care Model For America?, NAT’L. PUB. 
RADIO, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, July 31, 2008, at www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=92106731(last visited Jan. 3, 2009); see also Couchepin Interview, supra 
note 85 (interviewer stating that the Swiss system has been looked to as a model for an 
American universal healthcare system since Switzerland has a market-driven economy that is 
similar to the U.S. economy.) 
 159. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85. 
 160. Frontline, Five Capitalist Democracies & How They Do It, at www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/sickaroundtheworld/countries/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Frontline 
Report]. 
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regardless of socio-economic status, receives the same quality of care.164  
However, healthcare costs in Switzerland have increased substantially since 
1994, due in part to the fact that people tend to use healthcare services 
more when health coverage becomes compulsory in an effort to get their 
money’s worth, which has caused Switzerland’s president to question 
whether mandated universal coverage was the appropriate path to take 
towards universal healthcare.165 
While the standard price of medical services is negotiated between the 
providers and the insurers, the price of prescription drugs is set by the 
government.166  To keep costs as low as possible, the Swiss government 
requires people to take generics whenever possible.  If they choose non-
generic drugs, they have to pay at least part of the higher additional cost on 
their own.167  For prescription drugs, the government looks to other 
European countries and sets prices after considering the average prices of 
the most commonly used drugs.168  This approach is used despite the 
influence of powerful Swiss pharmaceutical companies, who have accepted 
the mandate of using generics.169  Perhaps this is because Swiss citizens still 
pay more for drugs than most other Europeans, and the Swiss government is 
admittedly open to paying more for “new drugs with huge therapeutic 
advantage” in an effort to “support innovation and not to support profits in 
[and of themselves].”170 
This approach to prescription drugs may be why Switzerland is a country 
where off-label and unlicensed drug use is common, particularly in pediatric 
wards.171  As discussed supra, SwissMedic has established that it will extend 
the patent protection for any drug where the manufacturer voluntarily 
endeavors to research uses of that drug in children, so that the drug may no 
longer have to be prescribed off-label.172  In Switzerland, the healthcare 
system is designed to provide all citizens with high-quality, comprehensive 
care,173 and this underlying aim explains, in part, the government’s 
 
 164. Id.; see generally USA TODAY, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HARVARD 
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE COSTS SURVEY (2005) (summarizing findings of how 
health care costs have impacted access to care, with special attention to members of lower 
socio-economic classes who tend to avoid care for chronic conditions due to cost). 
 165. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85. 
 166. Id.; see also Frontline Report, supra note 160. 
 167. Couchepin Interview, supra note 85. 
 168. Id. 
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 171. See Di Paolo et al., supra note 70, at 218, 220. 
 172. Id.; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 173. SWISS CONFEDERATION, FED. DEP’T OF HOME AFF., FED. OFFICE OF PUB. HEALTH, THE 
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openness to paying higher prices for drugs and providing incentives for 
continued research of unapproved uses. 
Not all drugs are covered carte-blanche in Switzerland, however.  Under 
the basic comprehensive insurance required of all citizens, only those drugs 
that are prescribed by a doctor and included in the “List of pharmaceutical 
specialties” are covered.174  This list is compiled by the Swiss Federal Office 
of Public Health (FOPH) and currently includes roughly 2,400 medications, 
although the list is frequently revised “in light of medical progress.”175  In 
addition to the drugs included on the “List of pharmaceutical specialties,” 
pharmacists are permitted to dispense equivalent generic drugs unless the 
prescribing physician has specifically ordered the brand name drug for 
medical reasons.176 
More generally, FOPH states that “[t]he basic assumption concerning 
medical benefits is that they comply with legal provisions relative to 
effectiveness, appropriateness and efficiency.”177  FOPH allows denials of 
coverage to be challenged before an expert commission, but the Federal 
Department of Home Affairs retains the authority to make the final decisions 
with respect to such appeals.178 
The Swiss government remains open to working with the pharmaceutical 
companies to approve new uses for drugs, while still understanding the need 
to protect patient welfare and keep costs manageable.  By limiting the 
market’s influence over the off-label use of pharmaceuticals by strictly 
prohibiting the promotion of off-label uses, the Swiss system focuses its 
efforts on patient safety as part of fulfilling the goal of providing all citizens 
high-quality comprehensive care.  The government’s control over drug 
prices and the inclusion of a limited number of drugs under the basic health 
insurance package adds to the concern about patient safety the additional 
concern of cost-effectiveness.  The Swiss approach to prescription drug is 
substantially similar to that of the U.K., albeit structured in a slightly different 
way, and thus outcomes for off-label drugs would also likely be similar. 
IV.  PROSPECTS FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Proposals for American universal healthcare have become one of the 
most discussed topics in healthcare over the past few years.  The 2008 
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presidential election made the prospect of universal healthcare in America 
more tangible than ever before.  All three frontrunners for the 2008 
Democratic presidential nomination touted their own versions of a universal 
healthcare regime, and although the candidates borrowed ideas from each 
other, each also introduced his or her own unique elements.179  Any future 
universal healthcare regime will undoubtedly embody a mixture of many of 
the elements introduced in these plans. 
A critical first step towards establishing any universal healthcare regime 
is to determine who will pay for it.  Unlike some European plans where 
coverage is completely funded by the government via tax revenue,180 most 
proposals for American universal healthcare seek to modify the current 
American health insurance system, in which some people are covered by 
government-funded medical coverage while others are  covered by private 
insurance.181  Most proposals also rely on the existing Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, but seek to strengthen federal and state partnerships 
for these programs,182 or mandate that all children and young people are 
covered through expansion of SCHIP and Medicaid.183  No matter how the 
coverage plans are structured, the proposals contain other common 
elements, including tax credits to individuals who cannot afford premiums 
and co-pays but who do not qualify for Medicaid,184 as well as tax credits to 
businesses so that they may provide comprehensive and “meaningful 
 
 179. Obama for America, Barack Obama’s Plan for a Healthy America: Lowering Health 
Care Costs and Ensuring Affordable, High-Quality Health Care for All, available at 
www.barackobama.com/pdf/HealthPlanFull.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter 
Obama Plan]; Hillary for President, American Health Choices Plan: Quality, Affordable Health 
Care for Every American, available at www.hillaryclinton.com/feature/healthcareplan/ 
americanhealthchoicesplan.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Clinton Plan]; John 
Edwards ‘08, Universal Health Care through Shared Responsibility, at www.johnedwards.com/ 
about/issues/health-care-overview.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Edwards Plan]. 
 180. See, e.g., Interview by Frontline with Nigel Hawkes, Health Editor for The Times of 
London (Nov. 1, 2007), at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sickaroundtheworld/ 
interviews/hawkes.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) (discussing the system of socialized medicine 
in the U.K.). 
 181. See Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health 
Coverage for All; see generally Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Executive Summary; see 
generally Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared 
Responsibility. 
 182. Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared Responsibility. 
 183. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health Coverage for 
All. 
 184. Obama Plan, supra note 179, at Quality, Affordable & Portable Health Coverage for 
All; Edwards Plan, supra note 179, at Universal Coverage Through Shared Responsibility; 
Clinton Plan, supra note 179, at Executive Summary. 
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coverage” to employees.185  Tax-credits may also be used to offset the cost 
of catastrophic illnesses in the aging baby boomer population.186 
Certain proposals have created institutions that would reform the private 
insurance market by scrutinizing plans to ensure that they are comparable to 
the public plan,187 or by creating purchasing pools which would allow for 
the negotiation of low premiums based on economies of scale.188  This 
proposed scrutiny of the private insurance market furthers an important aim 
of most universal healthcare coverage proposals: cutting costs to make 
insurance premiums fair and affordable for everyone.  How much people 
are able to pay is considered when determining what people will have to 
pay, such as by limiting premiums to a certain percentage of the 
beneficiary’s income.189  At the same time, these plans also focus on 
providing high quality, effectiveness-tested health care, with some form of a 
national, independent institution to ensure quality and effectiveness, another 
element common to most universal healthcare proposals.190  The purpose of 
these institutions would be two-fold: first, to ensure the highest quality of 
care, and second, to make sure that the procedures, drugs, and devices in 
current use are cost-efficient.  To that end, most proposals promote research 
and the use of generic drugs,191 and one proposal even goes as far as to 
encourage the re-importation of drugs from countries where they are less 
costly.192  Two suggested plans suggest changing the MMA so that 
Medicare would be able to negotiate drug prices with pharmaceutical 
companies, another effort to lower drug prices.193  Reducing cost would 
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clearly play a central role in any American universal healthcare program, as 
it currently does in the British and Swiss systems. 
V.  ANALYSIS 
It is no surprise that cost is a critical factor in determining how off-label 
drug uses are covered by government-funded insurance programs.  The 
British model demonstrates how important rationing is when working with a 
limited supply of resources.  In the U.S., total spending on Medicare after 
the implementation of the Part D Prescription Drug Benefit was expected to 
increase from $342 billion in 2005 to $417.6 billion in 2006, while 
continuing to grow in 2007.194  Spending on Medicaid, despite slowing 
around 2005-2006, is expected to “grow 8.1 percent a year on average 
from 2008 through 2016”, starting from a 2006 base of $313.5 billion.195  
Further, spending on prescription drugs is expected to total $497.5 billion 
by 2016.196 
At the same time, the Swiss experience demonstrates that when 
healthcare is compulsory for a population, an incentive to increase 
consumption of healthcare services is created because people feel 
compelled to get their money’s worth, which leads, in turn, to an overall 
increase in healthcare expenditures.197  The creation of this incentive is one 
of the ironies of universal healthcare—it has the potential to increase costs 
even while the government that funds or subsidizes the system works to 
contain costs.  The theory of “moral hazard” is commonly used by 
opponents of universal healthcare,198 but despite any negative 
consequences that result from the structure of its healthcare system, 
Switzerland still spends far less per capita on healthcare than the U.S. 
does.199  The U.S. spent $6,714 per capita in total spending on healthcare 
in 2006, the most of any country, while comparatively, Switzerland spent 
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$4,311 per capita, and the U.K. spent just $2,760 per capita!200  Despite 
much higher spending, however, the U.S. still ranks last in many key quality 
indicators among other industrialized countries.201 
Most proposed universal healthcare plans aim to provide healthcare 
coverage to all citizens while simultaneously reducing healthcare costs.  
These goals are important especially with regard to the pharmaceutical 
industry, as reducing pharmaceutical costs is a vital step toward reducing 
overall spending.  An element common to both the proposed American 
plans and the Swiss system is a focus on using generic drugs.  Additionally, 
many proposed American plans demand that the Secretary of HHS be able 
to negotiate Medicare drug prices with the pharmaceutical industry.  This 
could be a way to implement some government influence over drug prices 
without taking away all American capitalist spirit by allowing the government 
to control prices directly, as is the case in Switzerland.  By focusing on 
generic drugs and allowing the Secretary of HHS to negotiate with the 
pharmaceutical companies, pharmaceutical manufacturers will have a 
stronger incentive to keep costs low so they can effectively compete with 
generic drug companies and generate profits in the face of likely lower 
negotiated drug prices.  These changes could significantly impact the 
pharmaceutical industry’s willingness to comply with federal regulations 
concerning off-label promotion.  Given that there is a fair amount of 
disregard for such restrictions now, due to the high cost of post-market 
testing and after-market approval cost, as well as the short amount of time 
to enjoy patent protection, new measures which focus on generics could 
give pharmaceutical companies more incentive to get as much return on 
their investments as possible. 
In addition to spending substantially more on healthcare as a whole, the 
United States also spent almost twice as much as Switzerland on 
pharmaceuticals in 2005, and, once again, more than any other 
organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
country.202  While expenditure on pharmaceuticals as a percentage of total 
healthcare spending is substantially lower in the U.S. than it is in other 
countries, this is only because the U.S. spends considerably more on 
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healthcare overall.203  It appears that the high rate of spending on drugs in 
the U.S. correlates to a higher rate of per capita spending on healthcare, 
therefore implying that in order to cut the overall cost of healthcare, 
spending on drugs will also need to be cut.  As the Layzer case 
demonstrates, the cost of drugs used off-label can be substantial, and the 
fact that Ms. Layzer’s drugs are not covered by Medicare Part D could be an 
indication that the idea already exists in the United States that some costs 
are just not justified.204 
Further support that this idea is not a new concept in the U.S. is found in 
the fact that most American universal healthcare proposals would set up an 
independent national agency or institute to ensure effectiveness and quality, 
similar to the role of NICE in the U.K.  While the U.K. model demonstrates 
that an agency that focuses on comparative effectiveness of alternative 
treatments could have the effect in the U.S. of shifting the off-label question 
away from whether an off-label use is safe and effective to whether such a 
use is too costly, this common thread between all three candidate proposals 
suggests that a centralized agency similar to NICE is likely to become a 
fixture of any American universal healthcare system, along with the 
accompanying focus on cost-effectiveness. 
Additionally, under the healthcare structure in Switzerland, insurance 
companies are forced to compete with each other because the government 
believes that, in a strong capitalist society, “if there is competition between 
the health insurance companies, there will be a certain control among 
themselves; they will denounce the excesses of the others, . . . and also they 
will try to provide better services, and so you can compare” the plans 
offered by each company.205  The Swiss government directly rejects a single 
payer insurance system because it believes in the capitalist ideal that 
competition improves quality.206  One proposal for an American universal 
system would prefer to pool purchasing power for drugs, similar to the way 
PDPs work under Medicare Part D.207  As discussed supra, the fact that PDPs 
are provided by private insurance companies that make bids to HHS seems 
to be related to a more limited coverage rate of off-label drugs.208  While 
pooling purchasing power in such a way may lead to improved economies 
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of scale, the Swiss system has established that competition creates better 
choices for consumers, an idea which would likely also imply a better 
selection of off-label drugs.  By combining purchasing pools with stricter 
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, the outcome would likely be a 
lower rate of coverage for off-label drug use. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Current proposals for universal healthcare in the United States and 
European healthcare system models demonstrate that cost is and will 
continue to be a primary concern for healthcare policymakers.  While 
quality remains an important consideration, universal healthcare remains a 
lesson in basic economics, where a scarce supply of resources must be 
rationed among an endless demand for services.209  Both the British and 
Swiss healthcare models contain elements of cost-effectiveness, and both 
have definitive measures in place to help control the cost of drugs.  This is 
not to suggest that cost is the only concern, however, since one of the 
primary issues with off-label use is whether the off-label use is well 
supported by clinical studies that would demonstrate that the product is safe.  
Despite the focus on cost-effectiveness, all models and proposals discussed 
designate quality of care as a primary goal.  Therefore, even if off-label 
drugs may be better at treating certain problems or patient groups, the fact 
that the off-label use is essentially experimental may imply that expensive 
off-label drugs could be excluded from coverage on the grounds of both 
cost and safety. 
Indeed, in the U.S., the Medicaid model seems to focus less on cost-
effectiveness and more on being able to provide safe treatment to 
beneficiaries.  However, Medicaid budgeting varies so much from state-to-
state that it is hard to draw any firm conclusions about Medicaid decision-
making across the country.210  In contrast, the fact that Medicare Part D 
offers less coverage than Part B may reflect how the high level of 
prescription drug spending in the United States was considered when 
Congress determined whether the Secretary of HHS would have the ability to 
expand the compendia with peer-reviewed literature. 
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Ultimately, the FDA is unlikely to prohibit off-label use altogether.  A 
complete prohibition would involve regulating the practice of doctors which 
the FDA has repeatedly said that it will not do.  Unless there is a significant 
crackdown on off-label promotion, any restrictions on pharmaceutical 
companies’ profits is likely to give those companies stronger incentives to 
promote off-label use as a means of recouping the significant capital that is 
invested in drug development.  However, an important question that 
remains unanswered is how any potential universal healthcare system will 
cover such drugs.  Under the proposed plans that allow people to retain 
their private insurance plans, and for the people that will remain covered by 
Medicare and Medicaid, coverage might not change much in the short-
term—some off-label uses will continue to be covered as long as 
manufacturers can establish that such uses are safe.  As time goes on, 
however, and financial support for Medicare and Medicaid strains to 
support everyone covered by the two programs, it is quite possible that the 
determination of coverage for an off-label use will depend on more than 
just whether that off-label use is safe.  In the future, with respect to Medicare 
and Medicaid reimbursement, or in the context of a newly created national 
health care system, the debate over off-label drug use is likely to switch from 
whether an off-label use is safe to whether that use is cost-effective.  As the 
debate shifts, the opinions of healthcare providers as to what is best for their 
patients may not change, but whether those opinions align with what payors 
are willing to cover may eventually shape a new debate—one in which the 
question is how much is too much to pay, no matter how great the benefits. 
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